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Abstract 
Among the prominent recognized features of the industrialization of animal 
production over the past half century are growth in the stock of inflexible, or use-
dedicated, capital as an input in production and growth in productivity. Less recognized 
is a trend toward aseasonal production. We record the deseasonalization of animal 
production in Northern Hemisphere countries over the past 70 years. Using Irish farm-
level data, we provide evidence that low seasonality favors laborsaving investments. We 
also suggest that (a) lower seasonality can be Granger-causally prior to increased 
productivity, and (b) productivity improvements can be Granger-causally prior to lower 
seasonality. Process (a) should be more likely earlier in the industrialization process. For 
U.S. dairy production, our empirical tests find some evidence that process (a) operated 
early in the twentieth century while process (b) operated in more recent times. 
 
Keywords: capital intensity, dairy sector, Granger-causality, regional production 
systems. 
 
  
SEASONALITY, CAPITAL INFLEXIBILITY, AND THE  
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF ANIMAL PRODUCTION 
Agriculture has become more capital intensive in most of the world during the latter 
part of the twentieth century. This capital deepening has occurred largely in the machin-
ery, irrigation, and buildings categories (Larson et al. 2000). The structural effects have 
been particularly notable in animal agriculture in the developed world, where the phrases 
“factory farming” and “industrialized agriculture” accurately depict an animal production 
process for hogs, chickens, turkeys, and eggs that is broadly similar to the prototypical 
manufacture of widgets. These large farms have increasingly automated production proc-
esses, and most workers are employees with routinized tasks. Field crop agriculture, on 
the other hand, though greatly affected by mechanization and other technological innova-
tions, does not yet resemble an industrialized process. In this article we claim that how 
the use-specific nature of many investments in animal production interacts with seasonal 
variation in production costs is an important and overlooked detail in the evolution of ag-
riculture. Put simply, variable cost motives for producing seasonally conflict with the 
motive to make capital sweat.  
Notwithstanding attention from several academic fields, the process of industrializa-
tion at the sector level is not well understood. This is the case in agriculture and in other 
sectors. Most economic studies on economic growth that consider the agriculture sector 
assume agriculture to be the reference non-industrial sector, and their insights concerning 
the details of agriculture are limited. Technology in agriculture is seen to matter because 
it frees up resources for other uses (Mundlak 2000). Kuznets (1968) does emphasize co-
dependency, through spillover effects, between technical change in agriculture and other 
sectors. This view sees agriculture developing along with other sectors so that all sectors 
are comparably industrial.1 
As to what industrialization is, it has many features involving firm behavior, industry 
structure, the creation of new subsectors, and change in the nature of sector products. We 
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refer the reader to Meeker 1999, to Boehlje 1996, or to Drabenstott 1994 on characteriza-
tions relevant to agriculture. The components that we are interested in are primarily firm-
level and industry-level behavior regarding technologies used. The technologies should 
emphasize the control, systemization, and routinization of processes in order to be more 
assured of product volume and quality at low cost given the larger capital investment 
necessary for an industrial approach. Regarding the efficiency effects of capital deepen-
ing, Chandler (1990, p. 24) has written: 
These potential cost advantages could not be fully realized unless a constant flow of materials 
through the plant or factory was maintained to assure effective capital utilization. If the realized 
volume of flow fell below capacity, then actual costs per unit rose rapidly. They did so because 
fixed costs remained much higher and “sunk costs” (the original capital investment) were also 
much higher than in the more labor-intensive industries. 
How industrialization arises is largely a question of structural dynamics because 
the process is not instantaneous and there is no guarantee it will continue to the point 
where a sector or economy is recognized as being industrialized. Some inquiries into 
the path taken suggest the possibility of multiple equilibria (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1989; Chen and Shimomura 1998; Ciccone 2002) so that the economy needs a 
“big push” to industrialize. As Gans (1998) has pointed out, the existence of multiple 
equilibria in these models relies on the assumption that firms face two technology 
choices where one is increasing returns and the other is a constant returns reference 
technology. This “big push” literature leads naturally to policy proposals on engineer-
ing an equilibrium, typically a more industrial equilibrium given the increasing returns 
to scale that are present. Because of its macro-economy nature, this area of work has 
little to say about how the particulars of any given industry affect the industrialization 
process. Our interest is focused on animal agriculture, and we intend to show that sector 
detail can provide insights on the process.  
The formal literature on explaining the agricultural industrialization process is 
quite sparse. In one sense this is not surprising because the set of events presents 
somewhat of a puzzle. Agricultural produce is largely commodity in character, and the 
market tends to be both large and stable. Management of on-farm processes does not 
require intensive formal training. These technology attributes make the production of 
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food quite like cloth or pin manufacture, and so an explanation on the critical distinc-
tions is warranted. 
One theory is that agricultural industrialization is demand-led, through increasing 
demand by consumers and food retailers for product and process information (Barkema 
1993; Drabenstott 1994). The demand-side story is best at explaining the change toward 
greater downstream control and increasing vertical coordination across many of the food 
sectors in high-income countries. Consumers (or, more likely, their agents) want to peer 
inside the farm in order to verify quality and caretaking behavior (Hennessy 1996). Proc-
essors seek knowledge on product attributes in order to better satisfy consumers. A 
processing firm is in a better position to do so when ownership or contract provisions en-
able it to supply inputs and specify production practices. In addition, monitoring costs 
suggest the processor would prefer to deal with a small number of high-volume producers 
that use common, routinized production methods. While likely a facet of the subject, for 
industrialized agriculture can deliver higher quality and more  information, demand-side 
ideas have thus far explained little about the progress of industrialization. Demand-side 
arguments do not explain why crop agriculture is largely non-industrial. Nor do they 
identify common features in the technologies that tend to accompany industrialization. 
We conclude that some of the reasons for industrialization in an agricultural sector lie in 
the nature of the production process. 
Allen and Lueck (2002), in extending insights by Becker and Murphy (1992) on the 
importance of information in coordinating activities, hold that noise and other irregularities 
in the production process are reasons that crop agriculture has not industrialized. Hennessy, 
Miranowski, and Babcock (2004) go further to suggest that biotechnology innovations can 
promote three features of industrialization. These are demand for tight control over the pro-
duction environment, strong productivity growth, and an increasingly differentiated 
product. Motivated by Chandler (1990), in this paper we consider two other features of ag-
ricultural industrialization: the role of low variability in throughput and the role of 
enterprise-dedicated capital in enhancing productivity. 
Briefly, our problem is as follows. Animal production has tended to be seasonal, 
largely because of the biology of the animals themselves and the plants they are fed on. 
Seasonal production had faced the problem of perishability, together with the unpleasant 
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consequences of storage technologies (e.g., salting). Refrigeration, ease of transportation, 
and growing international trade have largely solved these problems, though at a modest 
cost (Goodwin, Grennes, and Craig 2002). These, by themselves, should promote the ex-
tent of production seasonality and yet we will show that animal production seasonality has 
declined in recent decades. The resolution of the conundrum lies, we believe, partly in the 
inflexible nature of capital investments. Unlike labor and the versatile tractor, most other 
investments in animal agriculture tend to be inflexible in adapting efficiently to seasonality 
because machines are often dedicated to a particular use. 
The intent of this paper is threefold. We will complement earlier work by Erdogdu 
(2002) on the United States by recording the deseasonalization of animal production us-
ing time series and statistical trends available for pork, beef, and (mostly) milk 
production in the Northern Hemisphere during the latter part of the twentieth century. We 
will propose a theory on the origins of this deseasonalization, and on what it means for 
the industrialization of agriculture. This theory utilizes the broad insight in Allen and 
Lueck (2002) that irregularities in production matter in favoring one sort of input over 
another. In their model, it was proprietary labor over hired labor because the former is 
more strongly motivated to cope with irregularities. In our case, labor in general will be 
favored over capital when there is seasonality because labor is in general the more flexi-
ble input. We will also test aspects of this theory using two different data sets. 
Our analysis is structured as follows. We first focus on dairying to review some of the 
most important trends in animal production in the developed world during the last 50 years. 
Based on monthly production data for dairy, beef, and pork in various countries, we present 
and discuss seasonality indicators. We then develop two brief models concerning the use of 
resources on farms facing different seasonal opportunities. Hypotheses emerge concerning 
temporal relationships between productivity and seasonality indices. We test for evidence 
on these hypotheses. 
 
The Seasonal Dimension: Dairying 
While we see no reason why our theory would not apply to other animal products, 
we focus attention on dairying for two reasons. First, data on monthly production are 
readily available and interpretable across several countries. Second, the issue is topical in 
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the dairy sector because traditional systems of more seasonal production remain viable, 
whereas poultry meats, eggs, and hogs are now produced overwhelmingly in non-
seasonal systems.  
In the traditional U.S. dairy areas of the Upper Midwest, New England, and New 
York, cows were grazed outdoors during the warmer half of the year. This approach took 
advantage of cheap in situ grass, while surplus grass and other crops made for cheap fod-
der during the winter when cows were confined. Cows tended to be calved in the spring 
to match lactation with grass growth. In part because of the perishability of liquid milk 
and in part because of milk marketing regulations, other regions also produced milk. 
Dairy farms in some of these regions, especially California, tended to be very different. 
Scale of production tended to be larger, output was less seasonal, and cows were largely 
confined in dry lot. During the period 1950-2000, production in the West expanded at the 
expense of the traditional regions and the expanding farms tended to be more industrial.2  
Table 1 provides an overview of some of the main innovations in U.S. on-farm dairy 
production over the last century. We categorize them as pro-seasonal (“P” entries), neu-
tral (“N” entries), or anti-seasonal (“A” entries). The pro-seasonal innovations are 
provided in the first column. Electric fencing has greatly improved efficiency of in situ 
grazing, while irrigation technologies have assisted in reducing the weather risk of an 
outdoor production system. Forage preservation techniques have improved grass utiliza-
tion efficiency and have helped to maintain the contribution of grass products to the dairy 
cow diet. These innovations have acted to alter seasonal costs. Final product storage in-
novations, P4, on the other hand, separate the timing of production from consumption and 
so allow for more intensive production in low-cost seasons. 
Concerning entries in the seasonality-neutral column in Table 1, genetic innova-
tions have increased dramatically the milking cow’s productivity. The consequences for 
seasonality are not readily apparent beyond making two points. The cow’s dry period at 
the end of lactation has become shorter, and this is a very direct way in which increased 
productivity can cause deseasonalization. There is also reason to believe that high-
yielding cows are less robust to weather and disease. They are increasingly bred with a 
constitution that favors an indoor life, but that may be a consequence of deseasonaliza-
tion and not a cause. The tractor, N2, has proved to be just as versatile around the  
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TABLE 1. Seasonal bias in noteworthy dairy production innovations, 1900-2000  
Pro-seasonal Seasonality Neutral Anti-seasonal 
Enhances competitiveness of 
grazing systems 
P1. Electric fencing 
P2.  Irrigation technologies 
P3.  Forage preservation 
innovations 
Separates milk production 
from consumption 
P4.  Storage innovations for 
dairy output 
Versatile in use 
N1. Genetic Innovation 
N2. Tractor 
Reduces year-round costs 
N3. Fertilization  
technologies  
 
Reduces role of nature 
A1.  Artificial insemination 
A2.  Housing innovations  
Use-dedicated capital 
A3.  Electricity in milking parlor 
A4.  On-farm bulk handling tech-
nologies 
A5.  Mechanized feed handling 
A6.  Robotic milking machines 
A7.  Downstream processing 
Mitigates problems with confine-
ment 
A8. Manure handling methods 
A9. Antibiotics and sanitation 
technologies 
Limitations on labor flexibility 
A10. Specialization in alternative 
outputs 
A11. Feed transportations/storage 
innovations 
 
farmyard as in the field and so the effect on the decision to confine cows is not immedi-
ate. Fertilization technologies have reduced the costs of concentrate feed, forage, and in 
situ grazing. In the absence of further information, we place it in the seasonality-neutral 
column.  
The third column in Table 1 lists what we contend are anti-seasonal innovations. Ar-
tificial insemination and housing innovations have diminished the role of nature in animal 
production and must be important components of sector industrialization. Entries A3 
through A7 are of particular interest in this paper and involve the growing capitalization 
of animal agriculture. As we will show, capital inflexibility should be important in de-
termining the rate of deseasonalization. For all these entries, the equipment put in place is 
dedicated and is inelastic with respect to inter-season substitution.3 Substitution of capital 
for labor facilitates the protection of quality when equipment speeds throughput and is 
easy to clean. In addition, automation generally complements the use of measurement 
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technologies. This means that a more mechanized production approach may help a firm 
respond to more stringent quality specifications. Lower tolerance on waste emissions will 
also require that additional capital be installed to purify and store by-products so that ad-
ditional environmental regulations may be anti-seasonal for animal production enterprises 
that are already largely confined.  
Concerning entry A8, manure is spread as fertilizer but it is an inconvenient form of 
plant nutrition. While all dairy production systems produce manure as a result of animal 
confinement, the problem is most severe for a completely confined production system 
and so innovations in that area have been most beneficial for non-seasonal production. 
Antibiotics, A9, are a substitute for sanitation. Although it is easier to monitor and main-
tain a health regime for a confined cow, cleanliness can be a problem and communicable 
disease can also be transmitted more quickly. Antibiotics and sanitation technologies help 
in this regard. Notice that investments in A8 and A9 also likely increase the stock of use-
dedicated capital. Another factor is that U.S. farms have become increasingly specialized 
(see Gardner 2002, p. 61). This likely means there are fewer alternative on-farm uses of 
dairy farm labor during the low output season. Transportation innovations in input mar-
kets, A11, are also likely to have been anti-seasonal, if only because feed and forage 
markets have become more integrated and so are less subject to regional effects. 
The direct effects of aspects of these developments for agricultural productivity have 
been studied in detail in the technical literature on agriculture. Of interest to us are their 
effects on seasonal structure in animal production. In the next section we will provide 
statistical evidence on the nature of change in animal production seasonality over time.  
 
Documenting Seasonal Patterns in Agriculture 
Table 2 reports the monthly production data series we have used from U.S., Cana-
dian (CAN), U.K., and German (DE) sources. The series have been transformed to take 
account of the different length of the months in a year. That is, monthly production has 
been divided by the actual number of days to yield average daily production and then 
normalized to a 30-day month. 
Seasonality of production has been measured by two concentration indices. Follow-
ing Erdogdu (2002), who investigated animal production seasonality at the U.S. state  
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TABLE 2. Monthly production data used 
Product Country Series Units Time Covered Source 
      
Milk US Milk production Million pounds 1930 -2000 USDA-NASS 
 DE Delivery to dairies Million liters 1951 -2001 Agrarwirtschaft 
 CAN Milk production Thousand liters 1945 -2000 Statistics Canada 
 UK Milk production Million liters 1936 -2002 Up to Nov. 1994: UK 
Milk Marketing 
Board; starting 
Dec. 1994: Rural 
Payments Agency 
      
Pork USa Production Million pounds 1944 -1981; 
1983 -2000 
USDA-NASS 
 DEb Production Thousand tons 1951 -1989;  
1991 -2000 
Agrarwirtschaft 
 UK Production Thousand head 1973 -2000 DEFRA 
      
Beef USa Production Million pounds 1944 -1981; 
1983 -2000 
USDA-NASS 
 DE Slaughter Thousand head 1951 -2000 Agrarwirtschaft 
 UK Slaughter Thousand head 1973 -2000 DEFRA 
aU.S. pork and beef monthly production data are missing in 1982, a year in which the NASS service suffered severe 
budget cuts. To fill in the gap in the time-series data, the calculated E was filled in using a cubic trend function. 
bNo coherent monthly production data are available for DE pork in the unification year, 1990.  
 
level for hogs, milk, and beef, we use the Herfindahl index (H ) and the maximum en-
tropy index (E ). Denoting month m share, 1m =  for January and 12m =  for December, 
in annual production in year t as ,m ts , 
12
,1 1m tm s= =∑ , the year t value of H  is calculated 
as 
212
,1( 100)t m tm s== ×∑H . Year t entropy is 12 , ,1 ln( )t m t m tm s s== −∑E  (Welsh 1988).4 Be-
cause 2,( )m ts  is convex whereas , ,ln( )m t m ts s−  is concave, an increase in dispersion among 
monthly shares should be identified by a lower H  and a higher E . In fact, for monthly 
production shares, E  reaches a maximum of ln(12) = 2.4849 when an equal share of 1/12 is 
produced in each month whereas H  has value 833.33 in this case. 
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For ease of interpretation we also report the peak-trough ratio of monthly production. 
In a given year it is calculated as the ratio of production in the month in which production 
is maximum, max,ts , to production in the month in which production is minimum, min,ts . 
The peak-trough ratio is max, min,t t ts s=R . By definition, R  values are limited to no less 
than unity and a value of one would indicate constant production across months in a year. 
Note also that the peak and trough months may differ across states and years. All analy-
ses to follow have been performed on both H  and E  indices but results are very similar 
and we conserve space by only reporting results using E . Descriptive statistics in the fol-
lowing tables are provided for R  and E , as the former lends itself most readily to 
intuitive interpretation. 
Table 3a reports the calculated indices at the national level. It is obvious that milk 
production seasonality has declined over time. The most marked decline is in Canadian 
dairy production, which changed from a strongly seasonal system to an essentially non-
seasonal system over the period 1950-2000. A similar trend, but to a lesser extent, is ob-
servable for pork. For beef, no clear trend toward more or less seasonality in pounds 
produced (for the United States) or head slaughtered (for Germany or the United King-
dom) is discernable.5 Table 3b reports the seasonal indices for 14 major U.S. milk-
producing states, in which monthly data were available from 1950 onwards.6 The decline 
over time in seasonal dispersion is uniform across states. 
An understanding of the table’s regional dimension requires some background on the 
significance of states in the U.S. dairy industry. Table 4 shows that Wisconsin and Cali-
fornia were the two most important milk production states in 2003. These states have had 
very different production systems, Wisconsin having smaller herds and more pronounced 
production seasonality. Since 1950, California has more than quadrupled production 
share to move from fourth to first in production. Wisconsin’s production share grew from 
12.7 percent to beyond 17 percent in 1980 before declining to 15 percent. The less-
significant midwestern states have lost production since 1950. New York has had a fairly 
stable production share while Pennsylvania has become a somewhat more prominent 
player. Southern states, small producers to begin with, have largely contracted while the 
parched western and mountain states have expanded.  
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TABLE 3A. Indices of seasonal production, averages per decade 
 Peak-Trough Ratioa Entropy Indexb 
 1930-39 1950-59 1970-79 1990-99 1930-39 1950-59 1970-79 1990-99 
Milk 
US 1.52 1.49 1.24 1.14 2.4746 2.4759 2.4828 2.4842 
CAN – 2.32 1.70 1.12 – 2.4447 2.4699 2.4842 
UK 1.48 1.40 1.39 1.21 2.4765 2.4791 2.4794 2.4833 
DE – 1.65 1.45 1.22 – 2.4708 2.4772 2.4829 
Pork 
US – 1.63 1.39 1.27 – 2.4728 2.4804 2.4824 
UK – – 1.40 1.42 – – 2.4788 2.4789 
DE – 1.30 1.16 1.22 – 2.4817 2.4839 2.4833 
Beef 
US – 1.29 1.22 1.21 – 2.4823 2.4833 2.4832 
UK – – 1.57 1.83 – – 2.4750 2.4708 
DE – 1.43 1.35 1.45 – 2.4784 2.4805 2.4785 
aA decline in the peak-trough ratio represents a decline in the seasonality of production. 
bA rise in the entropy index represents a decline in the seasonality of production. 
 
TABLE 3B. Indices of seasonal production, averages per decade 
 Peak-Trough Ratioa Entropy Indexb 
State 1950-59 1970-79 1990-99 1950-59 1970-79 1990-99 
CA 1.26 1.16 1.09 2.4818 2.4838 2.4846 
ID 1.50 1.26 1.16 2.4754 2.4822 2.4836 
IL 1.47 1.21 1.15 2.4773 2.4831 2.4837 
IN 1.52 1.17 1.11 2.4755 2.4837 2.4843 
KY 1.74 1.45 1.18 2.4647 2.4779 2.4834 
MI 1.44 1.11 1.08 2.4786 2.4844 2.4846 
MN 1.93 1.47 1.15 2.4613 2.4750 2.4835 
NY 1.51 1.23 1.11 2.4751 2.4825 2.4844 
OH 1.41 1.19 1.12 2.4782 2.4835 2.4841 
PN 1.37 1.16 1.10 2.4802 2.4839 2.4844 
TX 1.32 1.15 1.30 2.4804 2.4839 2.4808 
VA 1.39 1.15 1.15 2.4778 2.4838 2.4840 
WA 1.50 1.18 1.08 2.4761 2.4835 2.4846 
WI 1.70 1.32 1.13 2.4697 2.4809 2.4841 
a A decline in the peak-trough ratio represents a decline in the seasonality of production. 
b A rise in the entropy index represents a decline in the seasonality of production. 
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TABLE 4. Dairy production shares by U.S. state and by decade, 1950-2003 
State 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2003 
CA 5.1 6.5↑a 8.1↑ 10.6↑ 14.2↑ 23.8↑ 
ID 1.0 1.3↑ 1.3↓ 1.5↑ 2.0↑ 5.9↑ 
IL 4.5 3.4↓ 2.4↓ 2.0↓ 1.7↓ 1.4↓ 
IN 3.2 2.6↓ 2.0↓ 1.7↓ 1.5↓ 1.9↑ 
KY 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.7↓ 1.5↓ 1.0↓ 
MI 4.6 4.2↓ 3.9↓ 3.9 3.5↓ 4.2↑ 
MN 6.9 8.4↑ 8.2↓ 7.4↓ 6.8↓ 5.5↓ 
NY 7.6 8.4↑ 8.8↑ 8.5↓ 7.5↓ 8.0↑ 
OH 4.5 4.3↓ 3.8↓ 3.4↓ 3.2↓ 3.0↓ 
PA 4.8 5.6↑ 6.1↑ 6.6↑ 6.8↑ 6.9↑ 
TX 3.0 2.4↓ 2.6↑ 2.8↑ 3.7↑ 3.8↑ 
VA 1.7 1.5↓ 1.5 1.5 1.4↓ 1.2↓ 
WA 1.5 1.5 1.8↑ 2.3↑ 3.0↑ 3.7↑ 
WI 12.7 14.3↑ 15.8↑ 17.4↑ 16.4↓ 14.9↓ 
a The arrows indicate the direction of change in shares since the previous decade. 
 
To understand the dynamics behind the decline in seasonality as reported in Tables 3a 
and 3b, we test the hypothesis that E  is converging to a non-seasonal system. If deseason-
alization follows a geometric convergence process, then it can be modeled as 
1 1( )t ta −− = −E E E E , ln(12)=E . This is equivalent to an autoregressive order 1 (AR1) 
process:  
 0 1 1,t ta a −= +E E  (1) 
with the restriction on the constant that 0 1(1 )a a= − E . In this process, a1 is the conver-
gence rate: the higher its value, the faster E  converges to E . 
The results are given in Tables 5 and 6. These tables also provide test statistics for 
the hypothesis H0: 0 1(1 )a a= − E , i.e., whether constant geometric convergence to the 
non-seasonal system is an appropriate model. Looking at the results for the different 
countries in Table 5, the hypothesis of geometric convergence is rejected in all cases ex-
cept for milk in Canada and the United States. The convergence rates for milk vary  
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TABLE 5. Trends in deseasonalization—animal production in selected countries 
 
0a  
(Std. error)a 
1a  
(Std. error) 2R  Durbin-Watson 
p-value,  
0 1(1 )a a= − E  
Milk      
UK  0.39** 
(0.17) 
0.84*** 
(0.07) 
0.703 2.304 0.02 
DE 0.20* 
(0.12) 
0.92*** 
(0.05) 
0.888 2.338 0.09 
CAN 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.98*** 
(0.03) 
0.939 2.631 0.15 
US  0.07 
(0.07) 
0.97*** 
(0.03) 
0.940 2.632 0.30 
Pork      
UK  1.23** 
(0.48) 
0.50** 
(0.19) 
0.212 2.044 0.01 
DE 2.03*** 
(0.18) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.113 1.643 0.00 
US  0.98*** 
(0.27) 
0.61*** 
(0.11) 
0.368 2.220 0.00 
Beef      
UK  1.60*** 
(0.46) 
0.35* 
(0.19) 
0.128 1.996 0.00 
DE 9.12*** 
(5.00) 
-2.82 
(2.02) 
0.034 1.028 0.07 
US  2.2*** 
(0.33) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.013 2.000 0.00 
a *, **, and *** identify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
between 0.84 in the United Kingdom and 0.98 in Canada. Convergence rates are consid-
erably lower, but still significant, for pork, where they vary between 0.18 in Germany and 
0.61 in the United States. They are not significantly different from zero for beef in the 
United States and suggest time-series problems in Germany. Table 6 reports similar re-
sults for our set of 14 U.S. states. Convergence to a completely aseasonal system is 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level except for Minnesota. Nonetheless, significant 
convergence rates are observed, varying between 0.78 and 0.93. Overall convergence 
rates in these states are lower than for the United States as a whole. For both tables, the 
estimated convergence parameters are sufficiently large to suggest the existence of a unit 
root, and we will formally test for unit roots at a later juncture. 
As will be explained shortly, changes in animal productivity are important in our in-
quiry into the nature of deseasonalization. Here we only have reliable indicators for milk 
in the United States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and for pork in the 
United States. Milk yield per cow in liters or gallons is used as the productivity indicator  
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TABLE 6. Trends in deseasonalization–dairy production in selected U.S. states 
State 
0a  
(t-value)a 
1a  
(t-value) 2R  Durbin-Watson 
p-value, 
0 1(1 )a a= − E  
CA 0.47*** 
(0.12) 
0.81*** 
(0.05) 
0.853 3.041 0.00 
ID 0.36*** 
(0.11) 
0.85*** 
(0.04) 
0.886 2.361 0.00 
IL 0.35** 
(0.14) 
0.86*** 
(0.06) 
0.820 2.423 0.01 
IN 0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.91*** 
(0.03) 
0.934 2.379 0.01 
KY 0.32 
(0.12) 
0.87*** 
(0.05) 
0.874 2.749 0.01 
MI 0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.91*** 
(0.03) 
0.962 2.087 0.00 
MN 0.18 
(0.11) 
0.93*** 
(0.05) 
0.894 2.799 0.12 
NY 0.25* 
(0.09) 
0.90*** 
(0.04) 
0.928 2.741 0.01 
OH 0.46*** 
(0.14) 
0.82*** 
(0.05) 
0.818 2.700 0.00 
PA 0.27** 
(0.13) 
0.89*** 
(0.05) 
0.851 2.843 0.04 
TX 0.56*** 
(0.17) 
0.78*** 
(0.07) 
0.714 2.086 0.00 
VA 0.30*** 
(0.10) 
0.88*** 
(0.04) 
0.908 2.819 0.00 
WA 0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.89*** 
(0.02) 
0.964 2.659 0.00 
WI 0.27*** 
(0.10) 
0.89*** 
(0.04) 
0.911 2.378 0.01 
a *, **, and *** identify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
P  in dairying. Measures of hog productivity in the growing phase are more difficult to 
obtain, and we use average litter size per farrowing sow as the productivity indicator P . 
 
Theoretical Motivation 
Our intention is to explore interactions between productivity and seasonality over 
time. Table 7 shows correlations between (a) seasonality indicator E , productivity indi-
cator P , and production share (we label it as S ) for the 14 U.S. states listed in Table 6. 
The correlations between S  and E , between S  and P , and between E  and P  were 
calculated based on 1950 data for the 14 states, and again on 2003 data. In 1950, when 
the high seasonality systems of the upper Midwest had the large shares in U.S. total 
production, a negative correlation existed between production shares and aseasonality.  
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TABLE 7. Correlation between production shares, seasonality, and productivity in 14 
dairy states in 1950 and 2003 
 E  P  
 1950 2003 1950 2003 
S -0.23 0.55 0.46 0.31 
E    0.19 0.75 
This negative relationship turned into a strongly positive one in 2003 because by then 
the aseasonal western state production systems had large shares in U.S. production. 
The relation between productivity and production shares is, as expected, positive in 
both periods but it declined from 0.46 in 1950 to 0.31 in 2003. This decline indicates that 
other factors are important. We look next at capital inflexibility as a motive for the close-
ness in relation between aseasonality and productivity in the lower right part of Table 7.7 
The relationship has always been positive for the dates covered but has become much 
stronger over the last 50 years, increasing from 0.19 in 1950 to 0.75 in 2003.  
Model of Labor Intensity 
Let a single gallon of output be produced across the two seasons in one year. Frac-
tion 0.5θ >  is produced in season B, and the remainder is produced in season A. Let 
P , r , and w  be, respectively, output price, capital rental rate per year, and unit labor 
cost. The baseline labor requirement per gallon is λ  units per hour while the baseline 
capital requirement is κ  per gallon. The possibility exists of renting (investing) one 
additional unit of capital in order to reduce the labor requirement per gallon to αλ , 
0 1α≤ < . Recognizing labor flexibility and capital inflexibility, compare the baseline 
and investment scenarios. Table 8 summarizes the economic environment. 
The baseline BLπ  and investment Iπ  policy profits are as follows: 
 
max[ ,1 ] ;
max[ ,1 ] ( 1) ( 1) .
BL
I
P r w P r w
P r w P r w
π θ θ κ λ θ κ λ
π θ θ κ αλ θ κ αλ
= − − − = − −
= − − + − = − + −  (2) 
Notice that max[ , ]BL Iπ π  is decreasing in the value of θ , so that profit is decreasing in 
seasonality index θ  even after endogenizing the investment choice. Taking the differ-
ence, we have I BLπ π>  if  
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TABLE 8. Profits by season and investment decision  
Labor required Capital required  
Season A Season B Season A Season B 
Baseline (1 )θ λ−  θλ  θκ  (slack) θκ  
Investment (1 )θ αλ−  θαλ  ( 1)θ κ +  (slack) ( 1)θ κ +  
 
 (1 ) .r
w
α λ
θ
− >  (3) 
As the value of θ  declines toward the uniform production level of 0.5θ = , then the 
threshold ceiling capital rental rate at which investment occurs increases toward 
2(1 ) wα λ− . By contrast, if production is concentrated in one season only then the 
threshold ceiling capital rental rate is half the level, (1 ) wα λ− .  
Compare now factor uses under different θ  levels. If 1 (1 ) / 0.5w rα λ> − > , then 
farms with θ  close to 0.5  will invest while those with θ  close to 1 will not. Investing 
farms use lower labor levels per gallon when averaged over the whole year, αλ  and not λ . 
Investing farms will use ( 1)θ κ +  capital per gallon. But we cannot be sure whether this is 
larger or smaller than capital per gallon for non-investing farms because the only exoge-
nous feature distinguishing the farms is the lower value of θ  that motivates investment. 
Consider two farms, H  and L , with respective seasonality parameters Hθ  and Lθ  where 
1 (1 ) / 0.5H Lw rθ α λ θ≥ > − > ≥ . This set of inequalities, which is the only information 
available, cannot clarify whether ( 1)Lθ κ +  is larger than Hθ κ . Examples are readily con-
structed such that ( 1)L Hθ κ θ κ+ >  and such that ( 1)Lθ κ + <  Hθ κ . Under lower 
seasonality, the need to use capital that meets peak demand falls but the incentive to make a 
labor-saving investment increases. We summarize the positive finding above as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. Profit increases and labor used per gallon declines when production sea-
sonality declines. 
Model of Total Productivity 
Stepping away from labor substitution, we develop a slightly different two-season 
model that looks at the amount of fixed cost capital a farm is willing to bear in order to 
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reduce marginal costs of any sort. A representative farm produces animal output in two 
seasons; season A is high-cost while B is low-cost. Outputs Aq  and Bq  are produced in 
seasons A and B, respectively.  
There are four types of costs. There are seasonal unit costs labeled as Ac  and Bc , re-
spectively, where A Bc c>  and these costs amount to A A B Bc q c q+  per annum. There is a 
season-dependent, convex cost function ( , )A BC q q  that captures decreasing returns to 
scale. This cost function is also symmetric, ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )A A B B A B B AC q q q q C q q q q= = ≡ = = . 
There are season invariant unit costs labeled as c , and this unit cost parameter will 
change as a result of technical innovations. These costs amount to A Bcq cq+  per annum. 
Finally, there are per annum peak-load unit capital costs amounting to max[ , ]A BF q q . As 
with c , parameter F  can change as a result of technical innovations. 
The price-taking firm obtains season-invariant market price P  per unit sold where the 
assumption has been made that product is storable at zero cost. Firm annual profit is then  
 ( ) ( ) ( , ) max[ , ].A B A A B B A B A BP c q q c q c q C q q F q qπ = − × + − − − −  (4) 
Denote the optimal output choices as *Aq  and 
*
Bq . The symmetry of ( , )A BC q q  allows us 
to readily conclude that optimum outputs satisfy * *( )( ) 0A B A Bc c q q− − ≤ , so that * *A Bq q≤ . 
We characterize capital-intensive innovations as follows. They increase unit peak load 
capital cost F  while also decreasing unit season-invariant cost c . The sorts of innova-
tions considered here include items A2 through A8 in Table 1. The innovation will be 
adopted if the trade-off between costs is sufficiently favorable. Applying the envelope 
theorem to (4), profit-increasing innovations are ones that satisfy 
* * */ /( )B A Bc F q q q∂ ∂ ≤ − + .  
Now suppose that some set of incremental investment opportunities is available to 
the grower. These opportunities vary according to their trade-off between fixed and vari-
able costs. Those that decrease c  by a small amount c∆  and increase F  by a small 
amount F∆  with * * *( ) /( )B A Bc F q q q∆ < ∆ +  will not be adopted because they will decrease 
annual profit. All opportunities satisfying * * *( ) /( )B A Bc F q q q∆ ≥ ∆ +  will be adopted. The 
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threshold * * *( ) /( )B A BF q q q∆ +  is smallest at 0.5( )F∆ , when *Bq  declines to value *Aq  and 
production becomes non-seasonal. It is largest at F∆ , when * 0Aq = .  
 
PROPOSITION 2. As seasonality decreases, that is, the peak-trough ratio decreases, then 
the rate of adoption of capital-intensive innovations increases. 
 
The proposition can be interpreted in two ways. Suppose some multi-use innovation 
with a barnyard application (e.g., electricity or vacuum tubes) is commercialized. If it so 
happens that the innovation has an anti-seasonal bias, so that seasonality decreases, then 
one should see a pick-up in the adoption of capital-intense innovations that are already 
available to dairy producers. Alternatively, viewing Table 3b, one can take a regional 
perspective to conclude that the Wisconsin and Minnesota seasonal production systems 
should be less capital intensive than the California system. The proposition is also sug-
gestive of a relationship between lower seasonality and greater vertical coordination in 
production. Suppose that the grower sells to just one processor, and alternative sales out-
lets are not as profitable. As use-dedicated capital intensity increases under lower 
seasonality, then quasi-rents (due to sunk capital) increase and the grower becomes more 
vulnerable to hold-up by the processor. If contracts are not sufficient to secure protection 
then vertical integration may become a more attractive production arrangement.8 
This proposition would, by itself, suggest that deseasonalization should precede pro-
ductivity growth when productivity growth is primarily in the form of season-inflexible 
capital. However, the peak-load capital cost has another effect. Suppose that ( , )A BC q q  
takes the homothetic constant elasticity of substitution form 
1/ˆ( , ) [( ) ], 1A B BAC q q C q q
ρ ρ ρ ρ= + > . The optimality condition for an interior solution with 
* *
B Aq q>  is  
 
1/( 1)*
* ,
B B
AA
q P c c F
P c cq
ρ− − − −=  − − 
 (5) 
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and, given A Bc c> , consistency requires that A Bc c F> + . If instead A Bc c F≤ + , then 
the farm would not produce more in season B than in season A because the marginal cost 
of season B production would (weakly) exceed that of season A production. The farm 
would not produce more in season A either because B Ac c F< + . So * *A Bq q=  when 
A Bc c F≤ + .  
Differentiate (5) with respect to F , taking into account the associated change in c , 
/dc dF  0< , to obtain  
(2 ) /( 1)* *
2
( / ) ( ) /1| .
1 ( )
B A B A A B
c
changes A A
d q q P c c F c c P c c F dc dF
dF P c c P c c
ρ ρ
ρ
− − − − − + − + − −=  − − − − − 
 (6)  
The number is negative when A Bc c F> + , and so more capital intensity decreases the peak-
trough ratio. When A Bc c F≤ + , then * *A Bq q=  remains valid under the higher F  value.  
 
PROPOSITION 3. Let 1/ˆ( , ) [( ) ], 1A B BAC q q C q q
ρ ρ ρ ρ= + > , with A Bc c> . Let capital intensity 
increase, that is, F  increases and c  decreases by a sufficient amount that the new cost 
structure is adopted. Then production seasonality, as represented by peak-trough ratio 
* */B Aq q , decreases if greater than unity and does not change if equal to unity. 
 
This proposition would suggest that capital-intensity-induced productivity growth 
should precede deseasonalization. It is not a contradiction of Proposition 2 because there 
can be mutually re-enforcing feedback between the levels of seasonality and productivity. 
Note though that it is only when there is a base of capital-intensive innovations, that is, 
0F > , that the model suggests productivity growth should precede deseasonalization. 
When F  is low, one would expect to see deseasonalization before capital-intensity-
induced productivity growth in order to establish a capital base in the production system.  
 
CLAIM 4. For farms with low capital intensity, deseasonalization should precede capital-
intensity-induced productivity growth. For farms with high capital intensity, capital-
intensity-induced productivity growth should precede deseasonalization.  
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Empirical Relationships between Labor Intensity and Seasonality 
In order to test for the labor substitution hypothesis in Proposition 1, we obtained 
data on milk production in the Republic of Ireland. Grass grows well under Ireland’s 
moist, cool climate, and especially on the richer soils of Munster and South Leinster. 
Surplus summer grass is conserved as silage or hay for winter feed, but some grain-based 
supplements are also fed throughout the year. The data set we use is farm-level for farms 
surveyed under the European Union’s Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN).9 Produc-
tion data used to establish the seasonality index are recorded monthly, but all other data 
used are annual. Data availability was restricted to the period 1998-2003 because 
monthly data on earlier years are not available electronically. The observations used were 
the farms with complete, relevant information that were in the “Dairying” (meaning at 
least 66 percent of gross margin from dairying and about 40 percent of observations) or 
“Dairying/Other” farm systems.  
Absent information to distinguish between the two types of capital, direct evidence 
on the role of seasonality in automation decisions can only be obtained from a regression 
of labor used per gallon on farm production seasonality and conditioning factors. For 
each year, we ran the ordinary least squares regression 
 80 1 2 3 13/ ,i iiLab Q Q S Rβ β β β β +== + + + +∑E  (7) 
where Q  is farm output in 111,000 liters and /Lab Q  is annual labor used per 100,000 
liters of milk output. Regressor E  is the entropy index as previously discussed. Regressor 
S  is a dummy variable with value 0 for the “Dairying” system and value 1 for the 
“Dairying/Other” system. The iR  are regional dummy variables. There are eight regions 
comprised of groupings of one to six counties. Region 1 has been excluded to avoid 
dummy variable dependence, while region 2 (County Dublin only) is of negligible impor-
tance in milk production and its surveyed farms have been merged with the surrounding 
region (region 3). Results are provided in Table 9.  
The results provide some evidence to suggest, in years 1999 through 2002 at any 
rate, that larger farms tended to be more labor efficient. This may be due to labor indi-
visibilities and scale economies in such laborsaving investments as milking technologies. 
 TABLE 9. Results of FADN data, Ireland 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Constant 67.40*** 
(6.67)a 
19.08*** 
(1.00) 
17.15*** 
(1.36) 
21.63*** 
(3.43) 
3.20*** 
(0.46) 
86.26*** 
(8.84) 
E  -27.96*** 
(2.97) 
-7.09*** 
(0.42) 
-6.38*** 
(0.57) 
-7.57*** 
(1.44) 
-0.73*** 
(0.19) 
-37.97*** 
(3.77) 
Q  0.26 
(0.42) 
-0.61*** 
(0.06) 
-0.49*** 
(0.14) 
-0.58 
(0.41) 
-0.10*** 
(0.24) 
0.81 
(0.67) 
R3 (incl.  
  County Dublin)b  
-1.04 
(2.06) 
-0.38 
(0.36) 
-0.16 
(0.76) 
-2.07 
(2.17) 
-0.61** 
(0.25) 
1.81 
(3.66) 
R4 -4.68** 
(1.96) 
-0.57 
(0.40) 
-1.11 
(0.68) 
-2.65 
(1.93) 
-0.76*** 
(0.27) 
-2.44 
(3.98) 
R5 -5.82*** 
(1.52) 
-1.26*** 
(0.31) 
-0.96 
(0.62) 
-2.73 
(1.70) 
-0.76*** 
(0.23) 
8.01** 
(4.03) 
R6 -4.66*** 
(1.42) 
-0.88*** 
(0.29) 
-1.31** 
(0.60) 
-3.40** 
(1.56) 
-0.81*** 
(0.24) 
-2.35 
(3.14) 
R7 -5.15*** 
(1.43) 
-0.84*** 
(0.26) 
-1.20** 
(0.55) 
-3.62** 
(1.53) 
-0.71*** 
(0.20) 
-4.03 
(2.92) 
R8 -3.00* 
(1.69) 
-0.53 
(0.34) 
0.96 
(0.73) 
-2.84 
(1.96) 
-0.74** 
(0.29) 
0.13 
(4.51) 
S,  
0 for ‘Dairying’ 
0.85 
(0.95) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
0.64* 
(0.35) 
1.73 
(1.08) 
0.41*** 
(0.13) 
1.75 
(2.07) 
Total number of 
observations 
375 441 450 437 465 442 
R2 23.1 50.0 31.9 9.7 15.5 22.2 
a *, **, and *** identify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
b The regions are R1 (Border counties): Louth, Leitrim, Sligo, Cavan, Donegal, Monaghan; R2: Dublin; R3 (East): Kildare, Meath, Wicklow; R4 (Midlands): Laois, Long-
ford, Offaly, Westmeath; R5 (Midwest): Clare, Limerick, Tipperary North Riding; R6 (Southeast): Carlow, Kilkenny, Wexford, Tipperary South Riding, Waterford; R7 
(Southwest): Cork, Kerry; R8 (West): Galway, Mayo, Roscommon. 
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The milk production effect is of some relevance to policy because Irish dairy farms have 
been constrained by an annual production quota since 1984 and quota transfer has been 
severely restricted. It is very likely that some farms would expand scale, and at lower 
output price levels, if free to do so (Glanbia 2004). The regressions suggest that these 
farms would be less seasonal in their output profile. For all years, the entropy coefficient 
is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. These coefficients provide strong evi-
dence in favor of our Proposition 1, that labor per gallon declines as seasonality declines.  
 
Empirical Relationships between Total Productivity and Seasonality 
In Propositions 2 and 3 we identified conditions under which an increase in produc-
tivity can induce a reduction in seasonality and under which the reversed causal 
relationship can pertain. From this perspective, Cov( , )E P  in Table 7 warrants further 
scrutiny. We test for Granger-causality in Northern Hemisphere milk production data. 
Granger-causality tests whether changes in one time series contain information that can 
be used to forecast changes in another time series. It is not a statistical test of true causa-
tion. But the absence of Granger-causation would cast doubt on the validity of a 
hypothesis of true causation and so would provide additional evidence for consideration 
by the informed reader. 
Since the work of Yule (1926), the danger of spurious regressions in testing for rela-
tions among time series has been recognized. Evaluating the relationship of economic 
time-series data often results in highly autocorrelated residuals and may bias conven-
tional hypothesis tests (Granger and Newbold 1974). To circumvent this problem, it has 
become common practice to first test for cointegration among the series. If series are 
known to be integrated of order one, denoted by I(1), but not cointegrated, the practice is 
to estimate a vector autoregressive regression (VAR) model on differences. Alternatively, 
if the series are known to be cointegrated then Granger-causality can be determined using 
an error-correction model. Since the procedure will depend on the result of the pretest, we 
adopt a procedure proposed by Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996). This procedure is robust to 
the degree of cointegration and so avoids possible problems with pretesting. Nonetheless, 
we will first test for unit roots and cointegration.  
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Stationarity Tests 
Using the Dickey-Fuller procedure we test for the stationarity in the E  and P  indi-
ces. The Dickey-Fuller test is restrictive in that it assumes statistically independent error 
terms of constant variance. Phillips and Perron (1988) have developed a generalization of 
the Dickey-Fuller procedure that relaxes the assumption on the error terms, but their test 
is problematic when the true model contains a negative moving average. Because the true 
model is never known, Enders (1995) suggests performing both tests. We do so and the 
results for P  and E  at both the country and U.S. state levels are reported in Table 10. 
The table shows the test statistics, followed by the p-value in parentheses and the number 
of lags used in brackets.  
The test results are quite mixed and we cannot reject a unit root in most cases.10 For 
German milk and U.S. pork, the null of a unit root in E  is rejected according to both aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. For all states, evidence is inconclusive 
 
TABLE 10. Unit-Root Tests for Entropy and Productivity in Milk Production 
 E  P  
 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
US-Milk - 2.85 (0.18)* [10] - 9.72 (0.46) [10] - 1.48 (0.84) [2] -   2.28 (0.96) [2] 
CAN-Milk 0.14 (1.00) [3] -   4.58 (0.85) [3] - 0.33 (0.99) [2] -  0.93 (0.99) [2] 
UK-Milk - 2.14 (0.52) [2] - 17.96 (0.11) [2] - 1.61 (0.79) [2] - 14.28 (0.21] [2] 
DE-Milk - 3.67 (0.02) [2] - 31.36 (0.01) [2] - 0.91 (0.96) [5] -   4.12 (0.88) [5] 
US-Pork -4.74 (0.00) [10] - 37.06 (0.00) [10]    0.05 (1.00) [2] -   1.91 (0.97) [2] 
     
U.S. States-Milk 
CA - 3.95 (0.01) [2] - 13.26 (0.25) [2] - 3.06 (0.12) [2] - 29.26 (0.01) [2] 
ID - 2.31 (0.43) [3] - 18.30 (0.10) [3] - 0.55 (0.98) [4] -   1.33 (0.98) [4] 
IL - 0.57 (0.98) [5] -   9.18 (0.49) [5] - 0.74 (0.97) [2] -   2.42 (0.96) [2] 
IN - 4.59 (0.00) [5] -   2.62 (0.95) [5] - 0.70 (0.97) [3] -   2.98 (0.94) [3] 
KY - 0.82 (0.96) [3] - 17.49 (0.12) [3] - 1.41 (0.86) [5] - 23.59 (0.03) [5] 
MI - 6.23 (0.00) [4] -   3.65 (0.91) [4] - 2.25 (0.99) [2] -   1.84 (0.97) [2] 
MN - 1.42 (0.86) [5]  - 24.59 (0.03) [5]  - 1.53 (0.82) [2] -   5.58 (0.78) [2] 
NY - 2.22 (0.48) [5] -   7.76 (0.60) [5] - 1.81 (0.70) [2] -   7.40 (0.63) [2] 
OH - 5.97 (0.00) [5] -   7.92 (0.59) [5] - 2.66 (025) [2] - 16.32 (0.15) [2] 
PA - 0.40 (0.99) [4] - 10.05 (0.43) [4] - 2.23 (0.48) [2] -   7.96 (0.59) [2] 
TX - 4.24 (0.06) [2] -  10.86 (0.38) [2] - 2.65 (0.26) [2] - 20.97 (0.06) [2] 
VA - 0.70 (0.97) [3] -   4.25 (0.87) [3] - 0.99 (0.95) [2] -   5.72 (0.77) [2] 
WA - 3.56 (0.00) [4] -   6.35 (0.72) [4] - 3.39 (0.05) [2] - 10.43 (0.41) [2] 
WI - 4.22 (0.00) [5] -   8.41 (0.55) [5] - 2.10 (0.54) [2] - 10.00 (0.44) [2] 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values; those in brackets are lags. 
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on the existence of a unit root in E . While it is rejected according to the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (Phillips-Perron) test in California, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Texas, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin (Idaho and Minnesota), it is then accepted under the other test. 
The existence of a unit root in the productivity series is rejected at the 10 percent level 
according to the Phillips-Perron test in California, Kentucky, and Texas, and according to 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test in Washington. 
Cointegration 
Assuming that unit roots do exist, we proceed with tests of cointegration. We use the 
Johansen maximum-likelihood method (Johansen 1988; Johansen and Juselius 1990) that is 
based on a full system approach. We test for cointegration based on the trace statistics of the 
integrating vectors. In addition, the Engle-Granger method is used. The latter is a single equa-
tion method and it tests for the unit root in the residual of these cointegrating regressions.  
The results are reported in Table 11. The results obtained using the Engle-Granger 
method suggest that the productivity and seasonality series may be cointegrated in Ken-
tucky, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. The outcome of the Johansen method 
provides even more evidence of the need to accommodate possible cointegration. The 
trace test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration (rank of the characteristic roots 
equal to zero) for milk in the United Kingdom, California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. As will be explained, the way in which causality tests are 
conducted depends on the presence of integrated and/or cointegrated series. 
Granger Causality 
Standard Granger-causality tests have nonstandard asymptotic properties if the vari-
ables of a VAR are integrated or cointegrated. This complicates the tests for causality 
because one has to resort to simulations to determine the critical value in a causality test. 
The standard approach in this case has been to estimate a VAR in differences if the vari-
ables are known to be I(1) but not cointegrated, or to estimate an error-correction model 
if the variables are known to be cointegrated (Mosconi and Giannini 1992). An alterna-
tive is to employ an approach developed by Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) and employed 
in Tsionas (2003), for example. Dolado and Lütkepohl have shown that if variables are 
( )I d  and the true data-generating process is ( )VAR p , then fitting ( )VAR p d+  results  
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TABLE 11. Johansen and Engel-Granger cointegration tests 
 Johansena  
Engel–Grangerb 
(H0: no cointegration) 
 Trace Statistic Dep. Var. t-test p-value 
US-E -Milk  12.84 (0.24)  [1] US-Milk-E  
US-Milk-P  
-2.80 
-0.49 
 0.36  [10] 
 0.99  [7] 
CAN-E   12.70 (0.25)  [1] CAN-Milk-E  
CAN-Milk-P  
-2.04 
-2.11 
 0.75  [2] 
 0.72  [2] 
UK-E   21.88 (0.02)  [1] UK-Milk-E  
UK-Milk-P  
-3.08 
-2.83 
 0.23  [4] 
 0.35  [10] 
DE-Milk-E  - 3.04  0.25  [4] DE-E   15.81 (0.11)  [1] 
DE-Milk-P  - 1.97  0.79  [6] 
US-E -Pork  13.26 (0.22)  [10] US-Pork-E  
US-Pork-P  
-1.56  
-1.67  
 0.91  [10] 
 0.88  [7] 
US-States (milk only)    
CA-E  - 2.83  0.34  [2] CA-E   27.42 (0.00)  [1] 
CA-P  - 3.23  0.18  [2] 
ID-E  - 2.90  0.31  [2] ID-E   11.53 (0.34)  [1] 
ID-P  - 1.90  0.81  [2] 
IL-E  - 1.62  0.89  [5] IL-E   26.66 (0.00)  [1] 
IL-P  - 1.82  0.84  [2] 
IN-E  - 3.34  0.14  [2] IN-E   7.95 (0.65)  [1] 
IN-P  - 1.52  0.92  [3] 
KY-E  - 1.13  0.97  [3] KY-E   11.34 (0.36)  [4] 
KY-P  - 3.96  0.03  [2] 
MI-E  - 2.30  0.63  [2] MI-E     12.21 (0.29)  [1] 
MI-P  - 1.27  0.96  [2] 
MN-E  - 2.68  0.42  [5] MN-E     8.72 (0.59)  [2] 
MN-P  - 2.38  0.59  [2] 
NY-E  - 1.71  0.87  [2] NY-E   11.89 (0.31)  [1] 
NY-P  - 2.01  0.77  [2] 
OH-E  - 1.54  0.91  [5] OH-E   19.10 (0.04)  [0] 
OH-P  - 2.72  0.40  [2] 
PA-E  - 2.99  0.27  [2] PA-E   17.42 (0.06)  [2] 
PA-P  - 3.57  0.08  [2] 
TX-E  - 3.58  0.08  [2] TX-E     13.93 (0.18)  [4] 
TX-P  - 2.74  0.39  [2] 
VA-E  - 1.39  0.94  [3] VA-E   13.15 (0.23)  [1] 
VA-P  - 1.77  0.86  [2] 
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TABLE 11. Continued 
 Johansena  
Engel–Grangerb 
(H0: no cointegration) 
 Trace Statistic Dep. Var. t-test p-value 
WA-E  - 2.15  0.71  [2] WA-E   25.71 (0.01)  [2] 
WA-P  - 3.56  0.09  [2] 
WI-E  - 2.91  0.31 [2] WI-E   23.01 (0.01)  [0] 
WI-P  - 2.95  0.29  [2] 
a Trace statistic stands for the Johansen trace statistic using a finite-sample correction (Hall and Cummins 1999). The 
null hypothesis of p=0 indicates tests for no cointegration against the alternative of one or more cointegrating vectors 
(p>0). The p-value is reported in parentheses. The optimal lag length has been chosen using the Akaike-Information 
Criterion and is indicated in brackets. 
b In the Engle-Granger method, a large p-value shows evidence against cointegration. The optimal lag length has been 
chosen using the Akaike-Information Criterion and is indicated in brackets. 
 
 
in the usual asymptotics for Wald tests. This works because over-parameterization of the 
VAR process avoids singularity in the test statistic. As Tsionas explains, in order to test 
for statistical causality, first fit a VAR( )p d+  in levels and then apply a standard F-test 
involving the coefficients of lags 1 to p. 
The VAR( )p d+  model for the commodity in state j is  
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 (8)   
where , , 1 ,( , , ... , )j t j t j t p d− − −P P P  is the vector of productivities for the commodity in region 
j at time t. The ..
ja  and ..
jb  parameters pertain to the seasonality and productivity indica-
tors, respectively. The true VAR model is thought to go up to lag p, and the remaining d 
lags are included to make estimates amenable to Wald tests (Dolado and Lütkepohl 
1996). According to Dolado and Lütkepohl, the following causality tests are performed. 
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For deseasonalization to Granger-cause productivity gains, 0 21 22 2: ... 0pH a a a= = = =  
should be rejected. For productivity gains to Granger-cause deseasonalization, 
0 11 12 1: ... 0pH b b b= = = =  should be rejected. 
As to the formal test of equation (8), it is based on the assumption that the structural 
relationship and the parameters, such as mean, variance, and trend, do not change over 
time. When dealing with long time series this assumption likely is unrealistic and struc-
tural breaks in at least one parameter are probable. A classical testing procedure for 
structural change is based on Chow’s test (1960), which applies for a known break date. 
The sample is split into two subsamples, estimates are made of the parameters for each 
subsample, and an F-test is applied on the equality of parameters. The test’s main limita-
tion is that the break date must be known a priori (Hansen 2001). 
Alternatively, the timing of the structural change can be estimated. As we have no a 
priori knowledge of any break in the relationship, we would like the data to tell us if and 
when a break occurred. Bai (1997) proposes a least-squares estimation of a change point 
in multiple regressions. The analysis is extended in Bai and Perron 1998 and in Bai, 
Lumsdaine, and Stock 1998 in two ways. Bai and Perron develop the procedure to esti-
mate multiple structural changes occurring at unknown dates. Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock 
construct confidence intervals for the date of a single break in multivariate time series, 
including I(0), I(1), and deterministically trending regressors. In this latter test, the width 
of the asymptotic confidence interval does not decrease with sample size but is inversely 
related to the number of series that have a common break date. A similar approach is de-
veloped in Murray and Papell 2000. The approach of estimating a single break point on 
multivariate time series proposed in Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock is extended to multiple 
break points in Bai 2000. 
Following Bai (2000), we use a quasi-likelihood ratio procedure to estimate the 
change date. For the VAR( p+d) model in equation (8), the method compares the quasi-
likelihood ratio estimated over the entire sample based on a single parameter vector with 
the pair of quasi-likelihood ratios obtained by estimating over the period before and the 
period after the break. If the whole sample log quasi-likelihood exceeds the sum across 
the pair of time periods, then we assert that a break is not present and we choose the 
whole sample estimates. Otherwise, we assert a break at the identified point. Since in the 
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case with a break, the subsample estimates are completely independent, all parameters 
including the variance of the error term may differ. With this approach to estimating the 
VAR( p+d) model we apply the procedure of Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) to test for 
Granger causality. 
Results for sovereign countries and U.S. states are presented in Table 12. The first col-
umn indicates the country/state and commodity. For each pair, but with two exceptions, 
tests are performed on two periods. The exceptions are US-Milk and CA-Milk, for which 
two breaks were detected. The break year is indicated in the third column and is the year in 
which the earlier parameter regime ends. Note that the beginning year of the first regime 
and the ending year of the final regime depend on data availability, as indicated in Table 
2.11 The fourth column in Table 12 reports on the optimal number of lags, p, to be included 
in the VAR analysis based on the Schwartz-Bayesian information criterion. 
The results of the causality tests are reported in columns 5-6 and 7-8 of Table 12. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the test statistics and respective p-values on the test that produc-
tivity growth Granger-causes a decline in seasonality. Columns 7 and 8 do the same for 
the reverse hypothesis that a decline in seasonality precedes productivity growth. Note 
that the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. It could happen that both hypotheses are 
accepted (two-way Granger causality), or that neither hypothesis is accepted (no Granger 
causality). To help the reader in interpreting the results, we include a final column indi-
cating any detected Granger-causal relationship. 
We turn first to the results on sovereign countries. For dairy, only milk production in 
the United States gives a significant result in the causality test. There are two breaks, in 
1957 and 1979.12 The test shows that for the period prior to 1957, deseasonalization 
(growth in E ) preceded productivity growth. For each other country and commodity, 
there is one break and it occurs early in the last quarter of the century. For instance, with 
Canadian milk, U.K. milk, and U.S. pork the break occurs in the early 1980s while it oc-
curs at about 1975 for milk in Germany. 
Looking at dairy in the U.S. states in the lower part of Table 12, there are significant 
results in the causality test for Idaho, Minnesota, and Texas in the second time regime 
and these regimes start in 1968-76. In Texas, deseasonalization precedes productivity 
growth while the order is reversed in the more northern states. In two states, results 
 TABLE 12. Dolado and Lütkepohl causality test for aseasonality and productivity 
    →P E  →E P   
State/  
Commodity Causality 
Break 
Year 
Number 
of lags pa 
2χ -test p-value 2χ -test p-value Conclusion 
Countries         
1st period 0.23 0.63 2.79 0.10 →E P  
2nd period 0.18 0.67 0.25 0.62 - US-Milk 
3rd period 
1957, 1979 1 
0.01 0.91 0.08 0.72 - 
1st period 1983 1.92 0.17 0.00 0.98 - CAN-Milk 2nd period  1 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.97 - 
1st period 1984 0.01 0.81 0.19 0.67 - UK-Milk 2nd period  1 0.07 0.79 0.14 0.71 - 
1st period 1975 0.02 0.89 0.16 0.69 - DE-Milk 2nd period  2 0.01 0.92 1.72 0.19 - 
1st period 1981 0.01 0.31 0.04 0.84 - US-Pork 2nd period  2 0.22 0.64 0.01 0.82 - 
 
US-States Milk 
1st period 3.77 0.05 0.00 0.96 →P E  
2nd period 0.27 0.60 0.02 0.89 - CA 
3rd period 
1971, 1987 1 
0.96 0.33 0.01 0.93 - 
1st period 0.54 0.46 0.91 0.34 - 
ID 2nd period 1976 1 11.11 0.00 0.03 0.87 →P E  
1st period 0.15 0.66 0.47 0.49 - IL 2nd period 1975 2 0.23 0.34 0.03 0.86 - 
1st period 0.32 0.57 1.47 0.23 - IN 2nd period 1981 1 0.78 0.38 0.00 0.97 - 
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TABLE 12. Continued 
State/  
Commodity    →P E  →E P   
Countries Causality 
Break 
Year 
Number of 
lags pa 
2χ -test p-value 2χ -test p-value Conclusion 
1st period 7.71 0.01 0.01 0.93 →P E  
KY 2nd period 
1983 1 
0.00 0.99 0.38 0.54 - 
1st period 0.06 0.81 0.47 0.49 -  
MI 2
nd period 1968 1 1.04 0.31 0.39 0.53 - 
1st period 1.05 0.31 0.15 0.70 - 
 2nd period 1968 1 5.81 0.02 0.42 0.52 →P E  
1st period 0.01 0.95 5.35 0.02 →E P  NY 
2nd period 
1978 1 
0.13 0.72 0.60 0.44 - 
1st period 0.11 0.74 0.32 0.57 - OH 2nd period 1971 2 0.93 0.33 1.37 0.24 - 
1st period 0.38 0.54 1.07 0.30 - PA 2nd period 1967 1 0.34 0.56 0.83 0.36 - 
1st period 0.01 0.94 0.00 0.96 - 
TX 2nd period 1969 1 1.54 0.22 5.76 0.02 →E P  
1st period 0.05 0.82 0.00 0.96 - VA 2nd period 1972 1 2.02 0.16 0.10 0.31 - 
1st period 0.03 0.85 1.95 0.16 - WA 2nd period 1975 1 0.02 0.88 1.70 0.19 - 
1st period 0.08 0.78 1.08 0.30 - WI 2nd period 1974 2 0.01 0.94 0.03 0.85 - 
Note: In this test,  proceed by fitting a ( )VAR p d+  in levels and apply a standard F-test involving the coefficients of lags 1 to p. The H0 states that the parameters of lag 1 to 
p to the causal variable are zero. 
a The optimal number of lags was chosen according to the Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criterion. 
 
Seasonality, Capital Inflexibility, and the Industrialization of Anim
al Production / 29
30 / Roosen, Hennessy, and Hennessy 
 
indicate that productivity preceded deseasonalization earlier in last half of the twentieth 
century, to 1971 in California and to 1983 in Kentucky. The result for New York is quite 
distinct. Here we observe Granger causality going from E  to P  during the first period, 
lasting until 1978. 
Although the picture could be clearer, a possible interpretation of the results goes as 
follows. Consistent with Proposition 2, during 1930s through 1950s, technical progress was 
only made possible after production seasonality became sufficiently low so that return on 
capital exceeded the cost of capital. This interpretation is suggested by the U.S. milk result. 
Capital-intensive technology adoption then continued to the point where the high levels of 
installed capital required further endogenous changes in equilibrium production seasonality 
to be biased toward aseasonality. For dairying in U.S. states, evidence suggests that, from 
about 1950 onward, productivity growth tended to foster less seasonal agriculture.13  
Suggestive information is provided by Figure 1, together with data on the capitaliza-
tion of U.S. farms during the period 1935-45. During that wartime period, capital 
availability was extremely limited in the United Kingdom and the United States; capital 
on U.S. farms actually declined (Gardner 2002). And only in this period do we observe 
increases in seasonality in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Capital stock 
declined as well on U.S. farms during the farm crises of the 1980s, but deseasonalization 
of dairy production continued unabated. This suggests that the possible link between sea-
sonality and capital depth has changed over these periods. Furthermore, any role that 
deseasonalization may have had in eliciting productivity growth may have occurred just 
after World War II. 
 
Discussion 
This paper has provided strong statistical evidence that production seasonality has 
declined in many sectors of animal agriculture in North America and northern Europe 
over the 1930-2003 period. We have provided a simple theory to rationalize these empiri-
cal observations, namely, that capital is used most effectively when production 
seasonality is low. The theory provides two testable hypotheses. One is that high produc-
tion seasonality should be associated with high labor factor intensity. Using farm-level 
data for Ireland over the years 1998-2003, we find strong evidence in favor of this  
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FIGURE 1. Changing peak-trough ratios of dairy production in selected countries 
 
hypothesis. A second hypothesis is that deseasonalization is first necessary to induce pro-
ductivity growth, and only then should productivity growth precede lower seasonality. 
We find some support for this hypothesis. 
Placing our second hypothesis in context with macroeconomic writing on industriali-
zation, we note that industrial agriculture has adapted widely from manufacturing 
innovations. These adaptations have tended to be capital intensive, supporting the idea 
that spillovers from industrialization in other sectors can lay the foundations for an indus-
trialized format in animal agriculture. A cause for delay may have been limited 
knowledge on and control of animal biology, as reflected by the high level of production 
seasonality. Innovations surrounding bioengineering since the early 1950s may have re-
moved this impediment.  
One important limitation of our analysis is that the available time series are too short. 
To identify clearly the importance of deseasonalization early in the industrialization of 
animal agriculture, time series have to start before World War II and we were only able 
to obtain this type of data for U.S. milk. More and better data are needed in order to be 
more confident about why animal agriculture is becoming less seasonal. 
  
Endnotes 
1. Studies in economic history have shown evidence that agricultural seasonality 
should have a negative impact on the rate of non-agricultural industrialization and on 
productivity outside agriculture. This is because industrial plants are most efficient 
when labor supply is constant (Sokoloff and Dollar 1997; Sokoloff and Tchakerian 
1997). Our interest is not in the role of agricultural seasonality on the productivity 
and industrialization of external industries but on the productivity and industrializa-
tion of agriculture itself. 
 
2. Blayney (2002) provides detailed perspectives on recent U.S. production patterns. 
 
3. Hank van Exel, a dairy farmer with 1,600 cows in the California Central Valley, has 
rationalized (as quoted in Stuller and Schofield 1999) his decision to expand as fol-
lows: “Might as well. We own our feed truck and every hour it sits unused, we lose 
money on the investment. There’s an incentive to make use of everything, all of the 
time.” For readers not familiar with modern capital-intensive dairy farming and proc-
essing, we reference Tamime and Law 2001, in which the extent and variety of 
commercial dairy mechanization and automation applications is outlined. For on-farm 
U.S. agriculture in general, real net (of depreciation) on-farm investment was positive 
for most years between 1945 and 1980. A decline in real capital investment occurred 
only with the farm crises of the 1980s (for data, see p. 263 in Gardner 2002). 
 
4. In a probablistic setting, rather than our setting of mass weights, ,ln( )m ts  may be 
thought of as an index of surprise that event m occurred at time t. Physicists like to 
think about the entropy of energy as the amount of disorder in a system. Heat friction 
reflects disorder because energy is lost to the external environment. In our case, if all 
production is in one month, then production is very ordered and 0t =E . If production 
is uniform across months, then tE  reaches its maximum value at ln(12) 2.4849=  and 
the system is in complete disorder. 
 
5. Cattle require more time to mature than do hogs, while age at maturity varies con-
siderably by sex, breed, and feeding regime. These natural variations are further 
accentuated by weather and feed availability when animals are pasture fed. In addi-
tion, breeding stock and dairy stock make larger contributions to beef production 
than to production of other species. For these reasons, the correlation between birth 
month and slaughter month is likely to be less strong for cattle than for other hus-
banded species. 
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6. States were selected on the availability of continuous monthly production data over 
1950-2003. The chosen states represented 63 percent of U.S. production in 1950 and 
85 percent of production in 2003. 
 
7. We recognize the likelihood that other factors are also influential. For example, sup-
ply control policies of one form or another have been imposed in all of the dairy 
sectors we consider. In some cases, as in the European Union after the 1984 dairy 
quota (annual) program was imposed, impediments to the transfer of production 
rights have limited scale expansion. Non-transferrability will reduce the rate of de-
seasonalization if larger-scale operations tend to be less seasonal.  
 
8. We thank a reviewer for this insight on connecting facets of agricultural industriali-
zation. Sumner and Wolf (2002) use the 1993 Farm Cost and Returns Survey to 
discuss the impact of vertical integration on dairy production structure. They show 
that the degree of vertical integration is much larger in the U.S. Pacific states, the 
states that have taken production share from the traditional dairy regions of the Up-
per Midwest and Northeast in the past 30 years. 
 
9. A summary of the data is provided in Teagasc’s National Farm Survey of 2003; see 
http://www.teagasc.ie/publications/2004/20040809.htm (as viewed on 11/24/2004). 
 
10.  However, both tests are generally recognized to be of low power. 
 
11. We would have liked to base this analysis on time series of equal length, and this 
would require us to restrict the dates covered to the lowest common denominator. 
But the longest time series available in our sample reveals interesting results that dif-
fer from those exhibited by shorter time series, and we decided to use the maximum 
information available in our analysis. 
 
12. Using cumulative sum and Chow test analysis, Erdogdu (2002) also found evidence 
of structural change in U.S. livestock production seasonality. 
 
13. Remember that U.S. dairy data is available since 1930, but state-level data series 
commence in 1950. With the U.S. milk regime break in 1957, most of the data that 
identified →E P  is not available at the state level. Indeed, at the U.S. level we find 
a second break in 1979, similar to the breaks identified across different U.S. states. 
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